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OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF
ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES
by
Eric David Horodas*

INTRODUCTION

"[T]he rights and responsibilities of users and providers of
financial services are in flux. Serious value judgments must be
made with respect to what services shall be offered, by what institutions, and through what means."' Any proposed framework for the
development of an electronic funds transfer system should make
provision to accommodate diverse arrangements for transfers of
value. Any such system must provide for more than just the transactions that current systems accomplish. It must possess the "capacity to accommodate new needs, to treat different transactions
differently, and to interconnect the various payment mechanisms
into a system." 2 These qualities must be protected and encouraged
by a framework established to control the development of electronic
funds transfer systems. It is widely agreed that this goal will best
operational structure
be accomplished by a flexible, responsive
3
which promotes evolutionary growth.
In a labor and paper-intensive business such as banking, the
computer can, and is, revolutionizing the relationships between the
ordinary consumer and his financial institution. Technology offers
the promise of lower costs, faster service and, though some may ar*
B.A., University of Rochester, New York, 1975; J.D., New York University, 1978.
Mr. Horodas is admitted to practice in the State of New York and is currently a member of the Law Department of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.
1. Brandel & Gresham, ElectronicFunds Transfer: The Role of the Federal Government, 25 CATH. U.L REV. 705, 705 (1976).
2. Brandel & Gresham, Electronic Payments: Government Intervention or New
Frontierfor Private Initiative, 29 Bus. LAw. 1133, 1136 (1974).
3. Id.
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gue to the contrary, lower error rates. 4 The computer, however, is
not the panacea for all problems plaguing the banking industry. Instead, it provides the potential for more competitive, flexible banking in the retail sector. This changing technology is of concern to
lawyers, policymakers, and all segments of society. An examination
of the current rules under which the financial community operates
is required if one is to understand the necessity for change.
"Competition is the cornerstone of our national economic policy.
This is because competition offers the most effective way of assuring
that suppliers respond quickly to actual demands of customers, with
prices based on the cost of providing service. ' '5 Competition within
the financial community is vigorous. Commercial banks compete
among themselves to service the cash needs of big business. Savings banks, savings and loans, and commercial banks compete to attract deposits and, more recently, to develop checking account
services. There is also stiff competition among banks, savings and
loans, and credit companies for mortgages and for a share of consumer credit generally. The questions that arise from the advent of
new technology in the financial industry concern the effects of such
technology on that industry. How will competition among the various classes of institutions, and among the institutions themselves,
be affected? If the computer threatens to reshape the financial industry, will the new structure be socially desirable, i.e., will it promote the needs of, and service the greatest number of, users at the
least possible cost? Indeed, is it even socially desirable to preserve
competition?
The last question, in the context of the economic and legal system of the United States, must be answered by a resounding yes.
Competition is a spur to technological development, efficiency and
innovation. Competition lowers the ultimate cost to consumers and
responds rapidly to felt needs. Furthermore, if something can be
done on a competitive basis as a matter of economics, then the antitrust laws say that it should be done competitively. 6 Nevertheless,
the existence of great risks may justify some restrictions on competition in order to provide security to those embarking on electronic
funds transfer (EFT) ventures. Economies of scale may justify comof financial institutions because
petition-threatening combinations
7
of the high costs of technology.
4. Baker, Antitrust and Automated Banking, 90 BANKNG UJ.703, 703 (1973).
5. Baker, Access to Larger Computer Systems, (remarks prepared for the International Conference on Computer Communication, Washington, D.C., Oct. 25, 1972).
6. Baker, supra note 4, at 704.
7. Ubell, Electronic Funds Transfer and Antitrust Laws, 93 BANKING L.J. 43, 44
(1976).
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It is generally agreed that the computer technology necessary to
implement EFT terminal systems now exists.8 It is predicted that
within the next ten years, roughly twice the computer capability will
be available at half the present cost, resulting in a greater diffusion
of technology. 9 Common carrier communication costs are also likely
to drop fifty per cent during that same period.10 Competition is
likely to increase with specialized carriers providing high speed, reliability technology suited to computer-computer communications."
Furthermore, computer architecture is being decentralized. Socalled "ring-networks" are being developed in which the computer
hardware is geographically distributed. This allows the user to
purchase only a component of a physically distributed, intercommunicating system rather than buying its own facility or sharing a
jointly-owned facility. 12 One of the developers of the ring system,
Professor Farber of the University of California at Irvine, places
3
banking at the head of the list of possible users.'
The ultimate question is what type of organization should or
must exist to promote efficiency in EFT systems? Should the federal government own and operate a national payments system?
Should it be in the hands of a quasi-public corporation along the
lines of a public utility? Or should the choice be left entirely to the
private sector? If left to the private sector, how much input should
the government have? How will current antitrust laws affect its development? Even if in a negative way, is it appropriate to alter the
antitrust laws or provide an exemption for electronic funds transfer
systems? The remainder of this article will deal with these issues
and suggest alternative solutions to the problems presented.
I.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

One of the structural alternatives for electronic funds transfer
systems is ownership by the Federal Reserve System. Federal agencies have already taken steps to establish government owned and
operated components of electronic funds transfer systems. The Federal Reserve System operates automated clearing houses (ACH's)
8. See Baker, Whatever Happened to the "Checkless Society"?, 7 U. Micn. J.L.
REF. 481 (1974); Baxendale, Commercial Banking and the Checkless Society, 1
RUTGERS J. ComuPurERs & L., Fall 1970, at 88-89.

9. Withington, Beyond 1984: A Technology Forecast, DATAMATION, Jan. 1975, at
54.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Ubell, supra note 7, at 47.
Farber, A Ring Network, DATAMATION, Feb. 1975, at 46.
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on behalf of banks, 14 check clearing services,15 "Fed-wire, '"16
associated Culpepper Message Switching Center.17 The
Home Loan Bank Board provides general, computerized
keeping and transaction recording services to aid member
18
and loan associations.
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The progress of these agencies was slowed markedly as a result
of protests by the Justice Department, the White House Office of
Telecommunications Policy, and private industry. 19 The protestors
felt that government entry might foreclose private initiative, causing
artificial distortions in the market forces. They believed that the development of electronic funds transfer systems by private industry
would best serve the needs of a broad user population because it
would promote maximum efficiency, flexibility, diversity, specialization (where necessary) and innovation. 20 Private enterprise, it was
claimed, possessed the necessary range of financial and technological capabilities not likely to be found in a single institution-particularly governmental. 2 1 The public could thereby express its needs
and desires through its free-market dollar "votes."
There is a consensus that only with great luck could government planners possibly anticipate all future problems and opportunities to be encountered in designing such a system. 22 Once
created, a government monopoly would be slow to change and extremely difficult to displace. Those who operated the system would
have little or no incentive to innovate because there would be no
23
limitation on resources and little reward for cost reductions.
14. See Homrighausen, One Large Step Toward Less-Check. The CaliforniaAutomated ClearingHouse System, 28 Bus. LAw. 1143, 1143-46 (1973). In 1972, the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco began performing data processing and communications functions for the automated clearing house facility established by the California
Automated Clearing House Association. Id.
15. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 1, at 730.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 732. See Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, for a discussion of many of
the issues raised by private institutions opposed to intervention by the Federal Reserve System. See also Comments of the United States Department of Justice in the
Matter of Proposed Amendment of Regulation J and Related Issues Before the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 14, 1974.
20. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 1, at 732-33.
21. Id. at 732.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 734. Government bureaucracy, in contrast to the private sector, does
not generally reward successful risk-taking. Furthermore, regulators tend to give
greater weight to the dangers posed by innovation and upheaval to their careers and
often conclude that these dangers outweigh enhanced efficiency and service.
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Several arguments have been advanced in support of ownership
of EFT systems by the Federal Reserve System. First, it is claimed
that the Federal Reserve must own the system because of the critical importance of monetary policies affected by electronic funds
transfers.24 On the other hand, the Federal Reserve Board already
has adequate regulatory authority to accomplish whatever monetary
policy objectives it desires, whether the system is mechanical or
electronic. 25 What the Board needs is information, not operational
26
control.
Second, it is said that the Federal Reserve must operate electronic payment systems as a public utility to protect small financial
institutions from being "squeezed out" of the use of technical inno27
vation due to their lack of capital necessary to create new systems.
Sophisticated technical and marketing programs, however, have already benefited small banks. National BankAmericard, Inc. and Interbank Card Association give smaller banks access to a large share
of consumer credit.28 Furthermore, cooperative ventures may include small banks. For example, the privately owned California and
Georgia Automated Clearing House Associations allow small member banks to offer pre-authorized payroll deposits and automatic bill
payment. 29 Indeed, smaller institutions with creative and aggressive
management may be able to exploit new technology faster than
large banks. The City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio, a small, local bank, for example, has set up point-of-sale terminals in retail
30
stores and "Bank 24" centers around the city.
Third, it is said that the private sector is not responding to the
need for movement into the electronic era. 31 However, there is currently no foreseeable crisis in the nation's payment systems which
would justify government intervention in the form of ownership or
32
operation.
24. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1137. The Federal Reserve Board feels
that "float" hampers efforts to control the nation's rToney supply and favors EF' as a
method of eliminating "float." See Fed's Changes in Regulation J Are Pointed to Electronic Transfers, Am. Banker, Dec. 1, 1972, at 4. But EFT will dramatically reduce
float regardless of who owns and operates EFT.
25. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1137.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1138.
29. See Hornrighausen, supra, note 14, for a full description of the California Automated Clearing House Association.
30. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1138-39; Payment Sys. Newsletter, Jan.
1973, at 3, 4.
31. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1137.
32. Id. at 1139.
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The opponents of government ownership also fear that the Federal Reserve Board, if the proprietor of EFT systems, would lose its
perspective as a regulatory body. 33 Its roles would merge and, more
importantly, it would tend to lose exposure to the conflicting points
34
of view that regulation and competing institutions pose.
In summary, the arguments for government ownership are
weak, while those against government ownership are strong. The
federal regulators may most effectively achieve their legitimate
goals by encouraging private electronic funds transfer system initiatives. As two commentators recently concluded:
Governmental subsidization of EFT facilities would render it difficult, if not impossible, for private industry to compete in the provision of those services. This artificial restriction on competition
would severely curtail innovation in the development of services
and technicology, and virtually insure that electronic payment sysmodel, regardtems would configure themselves to a public utility
35
less of the benefits, or lack thereof, to the public.
If the government is not to own electronic funds transfer systems, what then is the role of government in the development of
such systems? The Justice Department has called for a "hands-off"
approach to government involvement in the development of electronic payment systems. 3 6 The Justice Department believes that unfettered competition will provide the necessary incentives for the
maximum effective utilization of present systems and the development of better systems. 37 It also feels that too much government intervention will "freeze" the market: investors are less likely to risk
capital developing EFT systems; private businessmen will fear the
strict regulation of private competition; and, any comprehensive system of regulations will be based solely on speculation. 38 Governmental agencies should, therefore, maintain flexible monitoring of
EFT development, while allowing the day-to-day decisions to be
39
made by the dynamics of the marketplace.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1140.
Id.
Brandel & Gresham, supra note 1, at 734-35.
Baker, Competition, Monopoly and Electronic Banking,in THE ECONOMICS OF

A NATIONAL ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM 47 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston Conf.
Ser. No. 13, 1974).
37. Comments of the United States Department of Justice in the Matter of Proposed Policy on Access To Federal Reserve Clearing and Settlement Facilities, No. 20,
at 106 (1975).
38. Weber, A Public Policy Overview of Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, 25
CATH.U.L REv. 687, 695-96 (1976). See also note 37 supra.
39. Id. at 695-96. The Justice Department concluded that excessive government
control in the preliminary stages is premature and that any extensive system of regulation would, necessarily, be based on speculation.
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Nevertheless, because banking is so heavily regulated already,
Congress and various regulatory agencies can have a tremendous
impact on determining: (1) the organizational structure of the industry; (2) the types of institutions which will be permitted to enter the
field; (3) the range of permissible activities of these institutions; (4)
the rights and obligations of the purveyors of these activities; and
(5) the rights of consumers. 40
The government will exert a major influence on the types and
rates of innovation and development of EFT systems. Statutes and
regulations, however, must be flexible enough to permit innovation.
Some risk-taking must be encouraged, with the recognition that failure is inevitable. Different institutions should be permitted to take
different routes, since only in that manner can it be shown which
methods are best. Statutes and regulations, which are neither
overly-restrictive nor threaten government monopoly, will best promote these goals.
Congress can control the access of institutions to electronic payment systems and the range of their permissible activities. Federal
law already defines the powers of federally chartered banks,4 1 savings and loan institutions,42 and credit unions.4 3 Federal law also
regulates certain activities of state-chartered-but federally insured-banks" and savings and loan organizations, 45 as well as
members of the Federal Reserve'6 and Federal Home Loan Bank
4 7
systems.
Absent a complete prohibition of any specific class of financial
institutions from offering electronic payment services, the lack of
the authority of one class of institutions to offer one or more consumer services or to establish new locations at which to offer its
services will affect that class's ability to compete, and perhaps pre48
clude that class from offering electronic payment services at all.
The traditional powers available to the various classes of financial
institutions were defined long before the birth of the electronic era.
In the past few years, various regulatory agencies have begun to expand these powers, including inter alia:
1. granting to savings and loan organizations third40.
41.
42.
43.

Brandel & Gresham, supra note 1, at 706.
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1976).
Id. §§ 1464-68 (1976).
Id. §§ 1751-90 (1976).

44. Id. §§ 1811-31 (1976).
45. Id. §§ 1724-30 (1976).
46. Id. §§ 221-522 (1976).
47. Id. §§ 1421-49 (1976).
48. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 1, at 708.
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49
party payment powers;
2. expanding the consumer lending powers of savings
50
and loans;
3. authorizing savings and loans to use remote service
units;51
4. permitting telephone transfers of funds from savings
accounts to checking accounts; 5 2 and,
5. allowing preauthorized transfers from savings to
checking accounts to cover over-drafts by depositors in com53
mercial banks-in effect, authorizing NOW accounts.

These new powers create either the possibility of related electronic services or transitional vehicles for entry into electronic payments systems. A further breakdown of the traditional barriers
between the various financial institutions in the services they provide may be desirable so that all classes of institutions may maintain a competitive posture in electronic banking activities.
These changes, however, have thus far been done in a piecemeal fashion. The reduction in distinctions among services offered
by different types of financial institutions has been inconsistent with
the policies underlying their original creation. Institutions such as
savings and loans and credit unions were intended to fulfill narrowly
defined functions and were given certain benefits, e.g., allowed to
pay higher interest rates. 54 If the fundamental distinctions among
classes of financial institutions are to be eliminated, policymakers
need to re-examine whether different treatment of these different
classes should be continued. The blurring of distinctions between
these classes is largely due to the changing financial environment of
the American business community: the concentration of productive
capacity in larger, multistate industry, geographic mobility of work55
ers, and technological change.
49. 12 C.F.R. § 545.4-1(3) (1976) allows federal associations with home offices in
New England states to allow the owner of a savings account on which interest or dividends are paid to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments for the

purpose of making transfers to third-parties.
50. Id. §§ 545.9.1, 584.2-1(b)(1)(4), 584.2-1(b)(1)(5)

(1976).

This may eventually

lead to the authority to engage in credit card activity.
51. Id. § 545.4-2 (1976). This regulation allows federal associations to place remote service units in stores, offices and transportation terminals and to participate in
the establishment and maintenance of such remote service units with any other
financial institution insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
52. Id. § 217.152 (1976).
53. 43 Fed. Reg. 20001 (1978).
54. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.1-217.6 (1976).

55. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 1, at 711.
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The basic issue, then, is which existing statutes and regulations
should be modified in light of the changing financial needs of our nation and the evolution of EFT systems? Underlying this issue are
the questions of the extent to which the public wants to preserve,
modify or eliminate the distinctions between existing financial institutions, and the extent to which it wants non-financial institutions to
enter the electronic payments field, either through regulated activities, or in a non-regulated, free market environment.
The Report of the National Commission on Electronic Funds
Transfers (NCEFT)5 6 regretably failed to answer these questions.
The Commission was composed largely of industry representatives. 5 7 As a result, the Final Report focused more on the perceived
needs of currently regulated institutions, than on the proper, future
58
structure of the financial industry and the needs of the public.
Congress or the President should impanel a new commission to examine and report on the deeper, public policy questions which were
given little consideration by the NCEFT.
II.

THE ROLE OF A QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATION

An alternative structure for ownership and operation of a national electronic payments system is a quasi-public corporation.
Three arguments presented in favor of federal government control:
(1) ownership by a quasi-public corporation would insure access by
small banks unable to devote sufficient capital to developing their
own system;5 9 (2) some public incentives are needed, since the private sector has not taken the initiative; 60 and, (3) if ownership and
control of the system is relegated to a quasi-public corporation, the
institutions
federal agencies charged with overseeing financial
61
would not lose sight of their role as regulators.
The creation of a quasi-public corporation is not, however, a satisfactory solution. At the beginning, it would lack the combination
of prior experience, technical expertise, and communications facilities necessary to successfully undertake development of a major
EFT project. The problems facing the United States Postal Service
56. EFT IN THE UNITED STATES, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CoMMISSION
ON ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
57. Of twenty-six Commission members, only five were truly representatives of
the public interest.
58. The remainder of the Commissioners, as a reading of the FINAL REPORT will
reveal, seemed unable to put aside their respective special interests in reaching their
conclusions.
59. Baker, supra note 4, at 713.
60. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1139.
61. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
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provide ample evidence of the inability of a new quasi-public corporation to overcome the burdens of bureaucratic operation and the
monopolistic posture inherited from its predecessor. 62 Public utilities have historically been slow to innovate and often have offered
only mediocre public service; 63 they stifle technology through laws
and regulations merely to protect themselves from competition.6
Most significantly, there is no need in this instance to create a cumbersome, quasi-public corporation, since private enterprise is capable of developing and implementing an electronic payments system,
if such a system is demanded by the public.

IIL

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY

The arguments in favor of private ownership and control of electronic payments systems are persuasive. Private enterprise is characteristically innovative, flexible and competitive. Competition, in
turn, is usually the most effective spur to development of a new
technology responsive to the needs of the marketplace. 65 Competition rewards the innovator and penalizes the laggard with a minimum of government interference. 66 Private industry has the
financial and technological capacity to develop and implement an
EFT system. 67 The vast complexity of the system alone forecloses
the possibility that any one institution will develop, construct and
operate all of the necessary components. 68 It will take the independent, and then combined, decisions of many organizations to
commit the substantial resources necessary to develop such a system. 6 9 Such development, if it occurs at all, will be governed by the
rules of economic competition and cooperation.
Nevertheless, there are dangers which must be avoided in implementing such a system, including, inter alia, (1) diminished competition resulting from overly inclusive sharing arrangements, 70 and
(2) the inability of many institutions to develop their own systems,
resulting in a denial of access to an EFT system within their market
and the competitive disadvantages that necessarily flow from that
62. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1147.
63. Baker, supra note 4, at 714.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 713.
66. Id.
67. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1147.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. More institutions sharing one system than is economically necessary to maintain the system.
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denial.
Given the high costs and substantial risks involved in implementing complex electronic payments systems, some joint action or
cooperation among financial institutions is necessary for the ownership and operation of EFT systems. The antitrust laws, however,
will have a restraining effect on the extent to which certain banks,
or groups of banks can act together. Such multiple, financial institution conduct is subject to scrutiny under section 7 of the Clayton
Act.72 That section prohibits any corporation engaged in commerce
from acquiring any part of the stock or capital of another corporation or joining together with another corporation, where the effect of
which may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
73
monopoly in any line of commerce.
In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,74 the Supreme
Court held that section 7 of the Clayton Act 75 applies to bank mergers, despite the fact that banking is a regulated industry, and, that
the Bank Merger Act 76 does not immunize otherwise approved
mergers from challenge under the federal antitrust laws. 77 Since the
fundamental purpose of section 7 is to "arrest the trend toward concentration ... before the consumer's alternatives disappear through
merger, '78 the Court found that commercial banking is not immune
from the anticompetitive effects of undue concentration simply because it is subject to a high degree of regulation or because it deals
in intangibles of credit and services rather than in the manufacture
or sale of goods.7 9 Competition among banks was found to exist at
every level-price, variety of credit arrangements, convenience of locations, service charges and investment advice. 80
71. See FRNAL REPORT, note 37 supra.
72. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) provides in
part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly.
73. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590-91 (1957);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964).
74. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976).
77. 374 U.S. at 352.
78. Id. at 367.
79. Id. at 368.
80. Id.
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In response to PhiladelphiaNational Bank, Congress amended
the Bank Merger Act in 1966.81 The amendment added a "convenience and needs" defense to any antitrust claims asserted against
commercial bank mergers.8 2 However, as the United States
Supreme Court noted in United States v. Phillipsburg National
Bank and Trust Company,8 3 the antitrust standards of Philadelphia
National Bank "were preserved in the Bank Merger Act of 1966."84
In the context of electronic funds transfer systems, section 7
would apply where two or more banks formed a joint venture to own
and operate the EFT facilities. Such sharing arrangements cannot
be so over-inclusive as to eliminate potential competitors from the
market, and will be tested under the criteria set forth in United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company.85 The United States
Supreme Court held in Penn-Olin that Clayton Act § 7 applies in situations where two existing corporations form a third corporation to
engage in a new enterprise, i.e., a joint venture.8 6 The test of
whether the joint venture is illegal is whether either party to the
agreement could have entered the market on its own.87 It is not necessary to establish that more than one of the venturers would have
entered the market. One need inquire only whether the joint venture ". . . eliminated the potential competition of the corporation
that might have remained at the edge of the market, continually
threatening to enter."88 The Court found that potential competition,
as a substitute for actual competition, may still restrain producers
from overcharging those to whom they sell. 89 It only need be shown
that there is a "reasonable probability" of one firm entering the market with the other remaining outside as a potential competitor.9 0
Thus, a joint venture in the EFT area would be prohibited if it foreclosed any prospect of competition between the banks that have
joined together to operate the electronic payment facilities. 91
Those who support joint ventures may argue that the costs of
system development are too high and the value of individual trans81. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976).
82. Id.
83. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
84. Id. at 358.
85. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
86. Id. at 168-70.
87. Id. at 173-74.
88. Id. at 173.
89. Id. at 174.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 173. The Court proscribed the joint venture between two competing entities, stating that "this joint venture may well foreclose any prospect of competition
...Id.
between Olin and Pennsalt.
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actions are so low that universal participation is necessary to
achieve rational economies. 92 Further, there also exists a major risk
of consumer non-acceptance. Closer examination of the considerations relevant to these systems, however, negates some of these
claims. If the relevant market area is defined too narrowly, the costs
may indeed be too high and the value of transactions too low. Yet,
there is no reason to believe that various regions could not support
systems competing in multiple markets. Innovation is resulting in
drastic reductions in the cost of technology, thereby requiring progressively smaller commitments of resources. 9 3 If transaction volume turns out to be insufficient to support a system devoted
exclusively to electronic funds transfers, the system could be
adapted to perform other tasks, e.g., inventory control, payroll and
general bookkeeping for bank customers. Lastly, a grandiose project
may simply be too ambitious when a smaller, less costly system
could adequately serve the bank customers' needs. 94
The degree of risk involved and the extent of front-end capital
investment may, however, justify initial cooperation in developing
interbank communications systems, particularly since such systems
have never been successfully implemented.95 In United States v.
Jerrold Electronics Corporation,96 the Court held that where a firm
enters a new industry, and its reputation and the growth of the entire industry are at stake during the developmental period, some restraints on competition are permissible. 97 However, the Court also
held that anti-competitive restrictions may become unreasonable at
the point when the firm and/or the product become well-established
in the market.98 Over-inclusive sharing arrangements, which might
tend to substantially lessen competition, may be tolerated at the
outset. As consumer acceptance increases, however, and the cost of
technology decreases, the legitimacy of these same joint venture
agreements will be analyzed under the test of Penn-Olin.99
Large EFT joint ventures will be examined by the courts, not
only to determine whether they lessen competition within the banking industry, but also to decide whether they have resulted in verti92. Bernard, Some Antitrust Issues Raised by Large Electronic Funds Transfer
Systems, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 749, 751 (1976).
93. See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
94. Rose, Antitrust and EF'r: Competition, Not Regulation (paper prepared for
delivery before Conf. on Developing Legal Issues Concerning Electronic Funds
Transfer Systems, Wash., D.C., Mar. 4, 1976).
95. Ubell, supra note 7, at 78.
96. 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960), affid per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
97. Id. at 555.
98. Id. at 556-58.
99. 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964).
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cal integration in the computerized, financial communications
industry, foreclosing competition from independent computer
firms. l0 0 Independent computer companies which already provide
non-financial communications may stand ready to enter the EFT
field, but be excluded by large EFT joint ventures which deal exclusively with their own members. These independent companies may,
in fact, have several advantages over joint ventures. For instance,
they may be able to provide services more cheaply and efficiently
than the financial institutions; they may be able to spread their fixed
costs over a larger number of services, including non-financial services; they may adapt more easily to advancing technology; they may
provide specialized services that financial institutions cannot afford
to provide; and, they may be able to combine electronic funds transfer services with non-financial services to generate entirely new capabilities, e.g., communications systems for all intercorporate
dealings.10 1
The United States Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Company v.
United States 0 2 found this type of vertical integration prohibited by
section 7 of the Clayton Act. 0 3 Under Brown Shoe, large EFT joint
ventures would violate section 7 if they deprived independent computer companies of a fair opportunity to compete and the result was
a substantial lessening of competition and increased tendency toward monopoly in the EFT industry.
Those institutions least likely to be able to develop electronic
payment systems are small, local financial institutions servicing customers within a relatively small geographic market. These institutions, however, have several alternatives available to them.1°4 First,
small banks may choose to forego participation in electronic funds
transfer systems completely, and stress better, humanized services
for customers with a distaste for dealing with machines. They could
also form joint ventures with other, similarly situated banks to offer
automated teller machines and point-of-sale terminals. The economies of scale needed to develop such a system may be sufficient justification for the joint venture, 10 5 if it can be shown that none of the
venturers would have entered the market on its own. 10 6 Lastly,
small banks may purchase access into one of the competing systems
operated by large banks in their area. Although the question of ac100.
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cess is beyond the scope of this article, smaller banks are somewhat
protected by the antitrust laws in this area as well. Where the operator of an electronic payments system has a natural monopoly in a
market, competing institutions must be given the opportunity of
membership in the system or access to it upon payment of reasonable fees in a non-discriminatory manner. 0 7 Furthermore, where an
electronic payments system is not a monopoly, but has the market
power to become one, it may not deny membership to an institution
in a discriminatory manner, solely because that institution competes
with one or more members of the system. 10 8
There are numerous other legal problems which will arise out of
EFT joint ventures. 0 9 Many of them are clear, per se violations of
the antitrust laws. For example, the venture may not fix prices, directly or indirectly, 110 and may not engage in group boycotts or refusals to deal,"' tying arrangements 1 2 or territorial or market
restrictions."1 3 None of these are issues which affect the basic structure of the financial community or their ability to offer electronic
payments services. They are doctrines well-established in the law of
antitrust and should not be modified with regard to the banking industry.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The financial industry is at a turning point. Fundamental
changes in our economy and the way Americans do business are underway. To adequately serve the needs of all customers, from the
largest corporations to the smallest individual depositor, members
of the financial community must adapt to these changes without losing sight of their origins and the functions that they are intended to
perform in society. They must offer efficient, useful, low-cost services based on the actual demands of their customers. While the precise, operational configuration that will best serve the public interest
is still unclear, it is clear that the banking industry must have the
potential to innovate, expand and adapt.
Electronic funds transfer systems may be the vehicle with
which the banking industry will keep pace with society. EFT policy
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is, however, in grave danger of becoming a disorganized mass of inconsistencies. Acceptable, effective legislation is required. Such
legislation must deal with the basic structure of the banking industry, the extent to which banks and other financial and non-financial
institutions can offer electronic banking, and the extent to which
this new electronic banking industry will be subject to the antitrust
laws.
If one thing is clear, it is that the structure which is ultimately
developed should be as competitive and flexible as possible. Competition promotes efficiency, innovation, low-cost, and responsiveness. As recently stated.
. . competitive ferment is far more likely to produce a payments
system that is sensitive to the needs of its intended users-because
these entities will not continue any service unless that service reand will strive to develop new services
ceives public acceptance
4
that will be accepted."
*

114. Brandel & Gresham, supra note 2, at 1149.

